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Pursuing Transparency Through Science Courts
Thomas G. Field, Jr.*

Introduction
A decision is transparent if people can understand why it was made.
Although not so labeled, the basic objectives of transparency were well
framed by Corwin Edwards in 1970. In testimony before The National
Commission on Product Safety, he said:
Risks ... are not unreasonable when consumers understand
that [they] exist, can appraise their probability and severity,
know how to cope with them, and voluntarily accept them
to get benefits that could not be obtained in less risky
ways.1
The frequency and magnitude of risks and benefits are facts. The
acceptability of risks associated with particular benefits is not. In the
best of all worlds, normative choices based on facts would be made
directly by persons at risk. We do not have the best of all worlds. As we
move from consumer to occupational and environmental risks, political
transparency increasingly must substitute for individual autonomy.
When we cannot each have our way, we should be able to decide which
facts are important, to have access to such facts and to be able to
2
influence decisions based on them.
Yet, not everyone is interested in transparent risk-related decisions.
Bureaucrats and politicians rarely care to be overtly responsible for
prices set on others' lives, or even on beautiful vistas. They would rather
insist that unpleasant decisions are mandated by circumstances beyond
their control - sometimes by science, sometimes by regulatory
procedures, both poorly understood. This is demonstrated when
politicians campaign against bureaucrats whom they ultimately control.
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See Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Evaluating the Expertise of Experts, 6 RISK 115
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Consider, too, a recent event involving the U.S. National Academy
of Sciences (NAS). In 1997, a federal appellate court found NAS
committees, when they provide technical advice to federal agencies, to
be subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). 3 That
statute, among other things, makes committee meetings public. 4 The
response was incredibly swift. A bill explicitly exempting NAS
committees from FACA was hustled through Congress in four days
and signed by President Clinton slightly more than a month later. 5
Even informed consumer choice is difficult to achieve particularly in medical treatment. Yet, most would regard patient
autonomy as warranting full effort. It is sometimes useful to analogize
from health care to regulatory decisions. 6 What distinguishes
decisions appropriate for physicians (experts) and from those
appropriate for patients (citizens)? Where do regulators fit as we
analogize to fully delegated regulatory choices? When are regulators
more like physicians; when, patients? When are outside opinions
warranted, and by whom?
Origins of the Science Court
Answering the last question first, I suggest that outside opinions
might sometimes usefully be provided by something Arthur Kantrowitz
first proposed in 1967. 7 Only later called the "Science Court," his
Institution for Scientific Judgment was intended to address a common
tendency to misrepresent facts for political ends. About ten years later,
he chaired a Ford Administration Task Force appointed to study ways
to subject scientific claims to public scrutiny before a panel of
competent, neutral scientists. 8 Also serving was Allan Mazur, who had
independently arrived at the same basic conclusion. 9 The group's
interim report, published in Science and soon thereafter aired at a
3
See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Shalala, 104 F.3d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
4
See 5 U.S.C.A. App. 2 (1996).
5
See Public Law 105-153 (H.R. 2977 was introduced Nov. 9, 1997, cleared for the White
House on Nov. 13, and signed by the President Dec. 17, 1997).
6
See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Zatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 RISK
39 (1998).
7 Arthur Kantrowitz, Testimony before the Government Research and Technical Programs
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 16,
1967).
8 See id.
9 Allan Mazur, The Science Court: Reminiscence and Retrospective, 4 RISK 161 (1993).
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public meeting in Leesburg, Virginia, admitted that:
We have no illusions that this procedure will arrive at the
truth, which is elusive and tends to change from year to
credible,
year. But we do expect to ... provide defensible,
10

technical bases for urgent policy decisions.
Preceded by generous publicity, the Leesburg Colloquium on the
Science Court was well attended. 11 The atmosphere was electric.
Noble experiments were proposed, and prominent officials promised to
support them. However, Ford's administration had no opportunity to
deliver, and later administrations saw no reason. Of that, Mazur has
related:
Looking back, the post-Watergate presidency of Gerald
Ford was a contentious time.... Investigative journalism was
still enjoying its greatest success, and many young
practitioners in other fields including the natural and social
sciences adopted the same combative stance, often as
champions of little people at odds with the big interests....
At that time, perhaps the most visible involvement of
scientists in a public controversy was the battle of New York
Times petitions, listing in one day's advertisement hundreds
of scientists who opposed nuclear power and on another day
hundreds in favor. To the public (including me), technical
more reliable than psychiatric witnesses
expertise seemed no
12
in a courtroom....
Labels are important, too. Kantrowitz has aptly observed that
"acceptance of the media term, 'Science Court,' was a mistake and has
sadly led to much confusion." 13 Further, Mazur has said that it:
got us into trouble nearly from the start, suggesting a return
to Galileo's time when established authority could dictate
that the sun revolved around the earth. Our intent was just
the opposite.... In the end, the Science Court itself became
so controversial that it had no chance of success. Like a sky
but just as
rocket, it got a lot of attention as it ascended
14
quickly fell downward to crash and burn.
10 Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and
Technology, The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 4 RISK 179, 180 (1993),
reprintedfrom 193 Science 654 (1976).
11 See Proceedings of the Science Court Colloquium 254 (1976).
12 Mazur, supra note 9, at 161-62.
13 Arthur Kantrowitz, Elitism vs. Checks and Balances in Communicating Scientific
Information to the Public, 4 RISK 101 (1993).
14 Mazur, supra note 9, at 161.
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Still, Mazur and Kantrowitz have remained diligent in trying better
to distinguish technical fact from hyperbole and fiction. I, but a witness
at Leesburg, have also been fascinated, finding that Court to be "a
source of inspiration and the focus of important dialogue." 15 I am
glad for this opportunity to discuss it.
Key Features of the Science Court
At the heart of the Institution for Scientific Judgment, as
Kantrowitz preferred to call it, was a new canon to govern and be
enforced by scientists:
Any scientist who addresses the public or lay officials on
scientific facts bearing on public policy matters should stand
ready to publicly answer questions not only from the public,
16
but from expert adversaries in the scientific community.
Strongly suggesting the idea of a U.S. trial court was a recurring
notion that advocates would cross-examine witnesses. Other aspects of
the proposed institution also bring courts to mind. As explained by the
Task Force, it was to hold public:
adversary hearing[s] ... governed by a disinterested referee,

in which expert proponents of the opposing scientific
positions argue their cases before a panel of scientist/judges.
The judges themselves will be established experts in areas
adjacent to the dispute. They will not be drawn from
researchers working in the area of dispute, nor will they
include anyone with ... [a predisposing] bias.... After the

evidence has been presented, questioned, and defended, the
panel of judges will prepare a report ... , noting points on

which the advocates agree an d reaching judgments on
disputed statements of fact. They may also suggest specific
17
research projects to clarify points that remain unsettled.
The Task Force report also briefly sketched methods for selecting
issues to be resolved, securing independent funding, and appointing
advocates, judges and referees. 18 Procedural details were to be refined
in governmentally-sanctioned experiments, but as Kantrowitz found:
It was not hard to persuade presidential campaigns to
promise such developments. However it was not found
15
95,
16
17
18

Thomas G. Field, Jr., The Science Court is Dead Long Live the Science Court! 4 RISK
100 (1993) (Introduction to symposium).
Kantrowitz, supra note 13, at 106.
Supra note 10, at 180.
See id. at 181-86.
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possible to get elected officials interested in [something]
intended to limit their flexibility to state the scientific facts
as they wanted them stated. 19
Seeking Competent Public Policy
The Science Court is directed at reducing the extension of
authority beyond competence, which was Pascal's definition of tyranny.
It will stand in opposition to efforts to impose the value systems of
scientific advisers on other people. It is so constructed in the belief that
more broadly based institutions should apply societal values and
20
develop public policies in the areas to which the facts are relevant.
How Science Courts Could Contribute
Notwithstanding its allusions to legal processes, the Institution for
Scientific Judgment lacked many court characteristics because scientists
were to control it. For example, regarding referees, the Task Force said:
"For discussion we propose ... a scientist advised by legal counsel, so

that full responsibility for this procedure can be retained by the
scientific community." 2 1 Still, the Court was designed to play a key
role in legal or political disputes and must be analyzed from a legal
perspective.
According to a simple model, legislatures make law, executives
enforce it, and judges, sometimes with jury help, determine whether
the law has been violated. Even in the context of purely public law, the
model tends to be incomplete. Modern agencies may legislate,
prosecute and adjudicate - and, at least in the U.S., are often called
the fourth branch. Further, Sheila Jasanoff has aptly suggested that
technical advisors who serve agencies may be regarded as a fifth
22
branch.
Disputes are resolved externally by rulemaking or adjudication.
Adjudication focuses on particular events and parties. It may decide,
e.g., whether a particular nuclear reactor should operate. Rules dictate
whether a particular kind of reactor, if any, should be licensed. The
processes and results are often fundamentally different. The Science
Court would seem more useful for rulemaking.
19
20
21
22

Kantrowitz, supra note 13, at 108 (citation omitted).
See supra note 10, at 180.
Id. at 183.
Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (1990).
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Rules are normative and often prescriptive; moreover, they address
what should be done in the future, not what was done in the past.
Yet, rules are also usually based on and must account for historical facts
and natural or descriptive laws. Normative rules cannot repeal the law
of gravity. It is here that Science Courts might contribute to a
technically competent and transparent process.
Transparency
As already suggested, politicians may not welcome transparency.
Members of the technical community may likewise eschew it. Some
reasons have been well stated by Halina Brown and her colleagues:
[I]t is unlikely that any scientific or technical group
continues to be politically detached. Most are intensely
involved through an elaborate system of consultancy,
advisory 23committees and participation as legal expert
witnesses.
Likewise, Kantrowitz has said:
Science has lost its independence. Its status has not grown
with its appetite for funds.... Frank Press called raising
money for basic research "the most important activity I can
undertake as president of the National Academy of
Sciences." Because the NAS is a prime source of facts
24
needed by arbiters of values, this poses a serious conflict.
Going to the heart of the matter, however, a report issued under the
auspices of Vice President Gore opined that the proposed Court
withered on the vine, largely because it is doubtful that
scientific and policy issues can be separated.... This is
particularly true in connection with risk assessment decisions
25
in emotionally charged contexts ....
...
Does this obviate the need or make it more compelling? To answer, one
must consider ways in which much U.S. technical policy is established.
U.S. Rulemaking
Optionsand Challenges
Congress ultimately controls most federal U.S. law making. Yet, at
least since the Supreme Court's Chevron decision, agency rules may
23

Halina S. Brown et al., Reassessing the History of U.S. Hazardous Waste Disposal Policy,

8 RISK 249, 271 (1997).
24 Arthur Kantrowitz, The Separation of Facts and Values, 6 RISK 105, 108-09 (1995)
(citation omitted).
25 Improving Regulatory Systems Team, From Red Tape to Results - Creating a
Government That Works Better & Costs Less 60 (1993).
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enjoy the same status as legislation. 2 6 For that to occur, agencies must
follow the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act (APA).27 It contains
both formal and informal rulemaking provisions. Formal rulemaking is
similar to U.S. adjudication. For example, facts are presumptively
introduced by testimony subject to cross-examination. 2 8 Because it is
more cumbersome, the APA does not require such rulemaking unless
statutes conferring substantive authority so dictate. 2 9 Indeed, in
Vermont Yankee, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the proposition
that the APA sets only

lower procedural bounds and that a court may routinely
require more than the minimum when an agency s proposed
technical factual issues or "Issues
rule addresses complex or
30
of Great Public Import."
Most scientists would dread cross-examination. Although it is
unclear exactly what was meant, the interim report said that the Court
"should preserve the right of each case manager to cross-examine
completely the positions taken by his adversary." 3 1 A trial-type process
would increase costs. 32 Although the issues were not particularly
technical, an infamous episode is often invoked to make the point.
According to Robert Anthony, then-Chair of the Administrative
Conference of the U.S., a formal rulemaking hearing to address
whether "peanut butter" should contain 87.5% or 90% peanuts lasted
33
over ten years and generated more than 7,700 pages of transcript.
Worse, it is hard to see how witnesses' demeanor relates to choices
among conflicting statements of scientific fact. 34 Still, Congress
frequently requires adjudicative processes for rulemaking, 3 5 causing
one to wonder whether some members (opaquely) intend to signal one
26 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
27 See 5 U.S.C.A., principally % 551-59 and % 701-06 (1996).
28 See 5 U.S.CA. § 557(d) and (e) (1996).
29 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (c) (1996).
30 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 545 (1978).
31 Supra note 10, at 185.
32 See Carl F. Cranor, Science Courts, Evidentiary Procedures and Mixed Science-Policy
Decisions, 4 RISK 113 (1993).
33 See Ass'n Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
34 See also Fed. R. Evidence 201 (annotations address "adjudicative" and "legislative" facts;
these exclusionary rules do not apply to the latter).
35 See Ass'n Nat'l Advertisers, Inc., 627 F.2d 1151.
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thing by granting rulemaking authority, while desiring, in fact, that no
rules be promulgated.
Only by contrast is "informal" rulemaking informal. 3 6 It requires
no oral hearing. 3 7 If one is held, questions are asked by hearing
officers, not advocates. Unlike formal rulemaking, ex parte contacts are
usually tolerated, e.g., to facilitate negotiation. 3 8 Yet, informal
rulemaking does require public notice and opportunity for comment.
As the APA has been interpreted, it also requires more than token
agency response to public comment. 3 9 Unfortunately, even informal
process has become so cumbersome that a blue ribbon Carnegie
commission found it not
surprising that EPA claims that informal rulemaking
procedures take approximately five years to complete, that
the FTC has completed only a handful of rulemaking
procedures in the past decade or two, that rules once
promulgated tend to remain "frozen in place," immune to
change that advances in scientific knowledge warrant, and
that many agencies ... have looked for alternative vehicles
... to make policy.4 °
Recognizing the challenge of balancing speed and cost against
public participation and careful analysis, the commission nevertheless
decried agencies' tendency to afford little if any opportunity for
participation. 4 1 It encouraged further study and experimentation
42
with negotiated rulemaking, for example.
Negotiation,Mediation and Beyond
What can negotiation, accomplish? Sheila Jasanoff has concluded
that: "In regulatory science, as in most areas of contested activity,
solutions are more likely to emerge from negotiation and compromise
than from bipolar, head-to-head conflict."4 3 'While some may protest
that propositions cannot be made true by agreement, what of unknown
36
37
38
39

See id.
See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp, 435 U.S. 519.
See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.

29 (1983).
40 Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government, Risk and the
Environment: Improving Regulatory Decision Making 108 (1993).
41
42
43

See id. at 109.
See id. at 111.
Sheila Jasanoff, ProceduralChoices in Regulatory Science, 4 RISK 143, 160 (1993).
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facts? What if additional evidence is too expensive or cannot be
obtained in time?
Where findings must be made at the frontiers of science, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Industrial Union held:
so Iong as they are supported by a body of reputable
scientific thought, the Agency is free to use conservative
assumptions in interpreting the data with respect to
carcinogens, risking error 44
on the side of overprotection
rather than underprotection.
In both law and science, proponents of the status quo are
advantaged. Evidentiary burdens vary widely. 4 5 Sometimes, a mere
preponderance may be enough. If not, burdens such as "clear and
convincing," "beyond a reasonable doubt" or even "certainty" may
apply with ever less likelihood of overturning the status quo. Facts are
not negotiable, but presumptions are. Consider again the prior
quotation from Industrial Union.
Negotiation is important to resolve such issues. When it fails,
mediation is increasingly popular; its popularity fosters an increased
46
availability of trained mediators and generates even more popularity.
Many disputed issues have been settled early in academic adversarial
experiments. 47 This is common; it is said, e.g., that "Only about 5%
of all cases commenced in Ontario actually go to trial." 48 Parties often
do not appreciate weaknesses in their own or strength in their
opponents' positions until fully prepared for a formal confrontation.
Particularly if agreement would not otherwise have been reached, such
effects are clearly mediatory.
Still, factual disputes unresolved in advance of confrontations may
be unresolvable with available evidence. Mazur has, thus, opined that
judges might add little. 49 He also found some disputants unwilling
to participate. 50 These are related because proponents of a status quo
44

Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656

(1980).
45 See Cranor, supra note 32.
46 See Thomas G. Field, Jr. and Michael Rose, Prospectsfor ADR in Patent Disputes: An
Empirical Assessment of Attorneys Attitudes, 32 IDEA 309, 319 (1992).
47 See Kantrowitz, supra note 13, at 109; Mazur, supra note 9, at 167-68.
48 The Mediation Centre of Simcoe County, Inc., Dispute Resolution Home Page, online at
<http:l/www.dispres.coml>(Ontario, Canada).
49 Mazur, supra note 9, at 168.
50 See id.
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usually must face potentially adverse outcomes before bargaining.
Processes without coercive power may well suffer, and a third party
with power to declare, e.g., that facts are inadequate, may be critical.
Still, the Task Force proposal left open many details, and some
parts may have caused confusion. For example, "referees" were to
maintain order. 5 1 This is typically what trial "judges" do. Trial courts
do not have referee-chairs, but arbitration panels do. I have long
regarded the proposed Court as more arbitral than judicial, because of
that and the use of ad hoc panels. 5 2 Also, the Court seemed to be
sparked by distrust of lawyers and courts, as well as by skepticism about
the ability of existing institutions to resolve sophisticated technical
issues transparently.
Judges were once hostile, but it is noteworthy that parties
increasingly face mediation and arbitration before being allowed in trial
courts. 53 I am aware of no court-annexed criminal arbitration, but
54
arbitration was recently added to U.S. Copyright Office procedures.
Conclusion: Science Courts, Arbiters & Boards
A federal report that looked askance at the Science Court
nevertheless applauded science boards at EPA and FDA. It
recommended that more such boards be created. 55 That is perplexing;
how do or might they differ?
Independence is one key difference. Advisory committees housed
within particular agencies are apt to be more political than the proposed
Court. Sometimes, too, advice less focused on needs of particular
agencies is helpful. 56 The Carnegie commission mentioned earlier
suggested several reasons why non-governmental institutions could
foster "creative approaches to address the major environmental, health
and safety challenges facing the nation." 57 Yet, institutions might not
need to be fully independent to serve such ends.
51 See supra note 10, at 183.
52 See Thomas G. Field, Jr., Which Scientist Do You Believe? Process Alternatives in
Technological Controversies, 6 RISK 97, 100-01 (1995) (Introduction to symposium).
53 See The Mediation Centre of Simcoe County, Inc., Dispute Resolution Home Page,
online at <http://www.dispres.com/> (Ontario, Canada); Susan M. Leeson and Bryan M.
Johnson, Ending It: Dispute Resolution in America 82, 141 (1988).
54 See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-803 (1996, 1998 Supp.).
55 See Improving Regulatory Systems Team, supra note 25, at 60-61.
56 See Wiener, supra note 6.
57 Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government, supra note 40, at 113.
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The commitment to separating facts and values offers another
possible key difference. Mazur has said that separating facts and values
never posed a problem in academic trials. 5 8 Should it be otherwise as in Industrial Union - this would not warrant throwing up our
hands. 59 In the U.S., virtually all legal process turns on the fact-value
separation; e.g., the Seventh Amendment to our Constitution dictates
that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court..., than according to the rules of the common law." [Emphasis
added.]
I agree with Kantrowitz: It is important to try to distinguish facts
and values. Not doing so increases the odds that subjective goals will
60
drive "scientific" findings that, in turn, support policy decisions.
Avoiding this warrants full attention, and the Science Court deserves
continued consideration.

58 Mazur, supra note 9, at 166-67.
59 See Industrial Union, 448 U.S. 607.
60 See Kantrowitz, supra note 24.
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